Bulls on Parade

(Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez with Colombian President Alvaro Uribe)

I am perfectly comfortable making the assumption that anyone who would take the time to visit the Red Mantis has already heard about the South American diplomatic crisis which began March 1 and ended just recently. Indeed, the crisis ended not with a bang, but a whimper, yet the implications of what was brought forward go well beyond a week's worth of turmoil.

In some ways I am both baffled and not surprised at all to see the U.S. media campaign launched in support of Colombia. When a plethora of diverse states ranging all across the political spectrum condemn the military operation by Colombia, which left 17 soldiers in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dead, and the United States is the only hold-out in support of the action (1), I feel the issue is not only decisive; it's wholly one-sided. It's precisely this decisive nature and the stubbornness of American foreign policy that baffles me. However, when approached with the facts the American response was not surprising at all.

The United States' "war on drugs" has positioned Colombia as a much-needed ally in counter-narcotics (a PBS News article from March 2007 noted that "Colombia has received nearly $5 billion since 2000 to help eradicate its flourishing drug trade" 2), but as of late Colombia has played an even greater strategic role for the west: the counter-Chavez state. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has been a strategic ally for the U.S. in attempting to block Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's continued spread of socialism across both Latin America and South America. Thus far, their support has included strong diplomatic relations and the signing of the Central American Free Trade Agreement, the cousin of Clinton's brainchild from 1994. Though not yet ratified (in part thanks to efforts by the Democratic Party), U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega explains that "CAFTA-DR is an "integral part" of U.S. efforts to forge a freer world-trading system. U.S. diplomacy in Colombia is focused on security interests and other issues." (3)

The contradiction between American-backed free trade and Latin American populism has been the ongoing dialectic in the Western Hemisphere for the last two centuries (dating back further, in part, with European imperialism). In an effort to subvert the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Revolution, as it has been dubbed, the U.S. has attempted to grapple its last remaining ties in the region to once again establish the neo-liberal policies first encapsulated in the Monroe Doctrine.

These reasons, in addition to Washington's rhetorical "war on terror", made the American reaction towards Colombia in the days following March 1 utterly predictable.

I. The Uribe/FARC Dilemma

Polarization is a simple phenomenon to understand and it makes for an easy point for people to rally around. Hence, we have an explanation for why President Chavez has been portrayed as an ally, and in many articles, an admirer of Raul Reyes (FARC second-in-command killed in the March 1 incursion) and FARC as a whole. If you are against Uribe, then you have a de facto sympathy, if not alliance with FARC. Beyond being a false dilemma, the allegations that Chavez must be a FARC supporter by default are simply absurd.

At the March 7 resolution summit between Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, President Chavez, and President Uribe, Chavez issued this statement in regards to allegations that he had funded FARC:

“I have never done it and will never do it. I could have sent a lot of rifles to the FARC. I will never do it because I want peace.” (4)

With such an alarmist reaction from the media, it is easy to see the apparent connection between a socialist leader like Chavez and a "left-wing" "terrorist organization" like FARC. Intuitive connections nearly always warrant a closer look, and in this case two conclusions becomes evident with even a cursory examination of the facts:

1. FARC has strayed greatly, if not all-out abandoned their roots as a Marxist revolutionary group. An International Relations and Security Network article from July 2005 points out that: "[FARC] has backtracked on its Marxist-socialist principles and now threatens national and regional security rather than helping Colombia’s poor." (5)

2. It is because FARC threatens the regional security of not only Colombia but South America as a whole that Chavez has little to no incentive to fund this 20+ year long civil war. It is not economically advantageous for one of Venezuela's largest trading partners and neighbors to be locked in perpetual conflict. A Reuters article from March 5, 2008 noted the two nation's significant trade relations, despite ideological differences:

"The two nations have around $6 billion a year in trade, with Venezuela importing cars, beef and medicine from its neighbor. Colombia imports chemicals, iron and plastic from Venezuela." (6)

Trade is compromised when conflict plagues either partner and political stability nearly always leads to mutual economic prosperity. For Chavez to pour massive amounts of money (more of the alleged $300 million to come) into a guerrilla organization like FARC, whose every intention is to continue the war with Uribe's right-wing government makes no sense, especially to a President whose nation has achieved immense economic growth from increased trade relations with its neighbors.

II. Uribe's Government

Paramilitary activity in Colombia, most of which has stemmed from right-wing groups, has been a part of the nation's history for decades. A January 2008 dissertation by the Council on Foreign Relations put it best: "Colombia’s civilians have been caught in the middle of turf battles between leftist guerilla [sic] groups and right-wing paramilitary organizations for decades." (7) Despite a peace accord signed in 2003 between President Uribe and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, the largest right-wing paramilitary group in the nation, evidence linking further paramilitary activity to Uribe's government has begun to surface. The CFR dissertation goes on:

"Human rights groups have long accused Colombian security forces of working in tandem with paramilitary units (Declassified U.S. government documents requested by the National Security Archive confirm this connection). But in 2006 and 2007, a series of scandals broke that implicated top public figures. The former foreign minister, at least one state governor, several legislators, and the head of the national police have all been tainted by the “parapolitics” scandal. In March 2007, the Los Angeles Times reported that the head of the army collaborated with paramilitary groups on military sweeps to eradicate left-wing militias.

As of April 2007, fifty politicians had been implicated. The widening scandal has cast doubts on President Alvaro Uribe..." (7)

Freer trade between the United States and Colombia has helped foster paramilitary activity as well. As the CFR goes on to note, "Multinational corporations have also been linked to the paramilitaries. In 2007, Chiquita Brands admitted in U.S. court that it paid nearly $1.7 million to paramilitary group over eight years. Other corporations including Coca-Cola and Drummond are now under investigation." (7)

The relevance of Colombia's paramilitary past to the diplomatic crisis is one of context. If a person is unaware of the actions and alleged scandals that President Uribe has been involved in, he sounds like a man simply fighting terrorism within his own country. Further investigation indicates that Uribe has been at least a tacit supporter of terrorism, albeit from the opposite end of the political spectrum. Though this does not legitimize the actions taken by FARC, it places the actions taken by Chavez and Correa in the context of internal Colombian affairs.

III. Colombia's Neighbors

Immediately after the attack, many South American nations responded with an overwhelming consensus against what Colombia had done. Among them were Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, Brazilian President Lula da Silva, Paraguayan President Nicanor Duarte, and Peruvian President Alan García, none of whom are on particularly friendly terms with Chavez. In a rare moment of unity, pro-chavista governments, including Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega and Bolivia's President Evo Morales responded the same way, with the former temporarily cutting off trade relations with Colombia almost immediately. (8)

Following suite, the Organization of American States adopted a resolution condemning the Colombian incursion, saying that the attack was "a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of international law." (9)

This remarkable consensus makes one see just how definitive this issue truly is. Regardless of intent, the Colombian government violated Ecuadorian national sovereignty, positioning themselves as a threat to continued Latin American stability.

An article from Venezuela Analysis from March 8, 2008 on President Correa's response to the diplomatic talks between his own nation and Colombia further pointed out the South American move towards peace:

"Following the heated debates that took place over the 10-hour day, President Correa announced that 'through dialogue, we were able to overcome a very grave conflict.' Nonetheless, the Ecuadorian president maintained a stern demeanor upon shaking hands with Uribe at the end of the summit.

'The problem is not solved with an embrace,' Correa commented after making amends with Uribe, urging the Colombian President to 'accept international mediation to resolve the problem of the FARC.'" (10)

Correa's attitude mirrors that of Chavez and many of the other leaders who rose to condemn Colombia's actions: They are motivated by a desire for peace and stability in the region.

IV. The Chavez/FARC Files

Immediately after Colombia's illegal raid was discovered and investigated by the Ecuadorian government, President Uribe rose to defend himself. Sensing overwhelming hostility from his neighbors, he seized on the opportunity to further demonize his political rival President Chavez, who began to immediately mobilize troops to mount at the Venezuelan/Colombian border. Accusations of Chavez funding FARC with $300 million in exchange for the two hostages released earlier this year began to arise, based on Colombian claims that a laptop recovered at Raul Reyes' camp site in Ecuador contained proof.

Though the documents have not been verified by any third party (the OAS, the U.N., etc.), the American media seems bent on a guilty-until-proven-innocent mentality (11). Many of the documents still remain classified and to my knowledge, those that have been declassified have only been released to a few select Colombian news organs.

BBC News Reporter Greg Palast claims to have had access to the declassified portion of the recovered documents alleging the connection between Chavez and FARC. Admittedly, his has been the only textual analysis of the documents that I have been able to find to this point. However, Palast suggests that no connection exists prima facie and instead the Colombian government has attempted to forge a story out of nothing:

"I read [the documents]. While you can read it all in español, here is, in translation, the one and only mention of the alleged $300 million from Chavez is this:

'… With relation to the 300, which from now on we will call “dossier,” efforts are now going forward at the instructions of the boss to the cojo [slang term for ‘cripple’], which I will explain in a separate note. Let’s call the boss Ángel, and the cripple Ernesto.'

Got that? Where is Hugo? Where’s 300 million? And 300 what? Indeed, in context, the note is all about the hostage exchange with the FARC that Chavez was working on at the time (December 23, 2007) at the request of the Colombian government." (12)

Palast goes on to note that the "code name" for Chavez, in all likelihood, is not a codename at all, and that the number 300 almost certainly referred to FARC hostages:

"As to the 300, I must note that the FARC’s previous prisoner exchange involved 300 prisoners. Is that what the ‘300’ refers to? ¿Quien sabe? Unlike Uribe, Bush and the US press, I won’t guess or make up a phastasmogoric story about Chavez spending money he doesn’t even have.

To bolster their case, the Colombians claim, with no evidence whatsoever, that the mysterious “Angel” is the code name for Chavez. But in the memo, Chavez goes by the code name … Chavez." (12)

Palast makes a compelling case against the American media's almost immediate consensus on the issue. If indeed the documents he has accessed (13) are the recovered documents, it would seem as though there has been a great deal of fabrication on the part of Uribe's regime. This would explain Uribe's erratic behavior as of late, accusing Chavez of "genocide" and threatening to being him before the International Criminal Court (14), only to then withdraw such threats a mere four days later (15).

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It seems as though a further military confrontation in South America has been averted. President Chavez put it best shortly following the diplomatic summit: "This summit was a gift from God." He went on to say: "We are all happy. Peace! We must unite and integrate." (16)